Abstract. The elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) achieves the security level equivalent to that of digital signature algorithm (DSA), but has a lower computational cost and a smaller key size than the DSA. Till now so many proxy multi-signature schemes based on ECC without pairings have been proposed. To the best of our knowledge, none of them are provable secure. Having motivated, we first define a formal security model and then propose a provable secure proxy multi-signature scheme based on ECC without pairings. Our proposed scheme can play a crucial role in application to distributed systems, grid computing, mobile agent environment etc.
Introduction
Proxy signature (introduced by Mambo et al. [26] in 1996) allows an entity called original signer, to delegate its signing capability to another entity, called proxy signer. Since it is proposed, the proxy signature schemes have been suggested for use in many applications, particularly in distributed computing, where delegation of rights is quite common. According to the number of users in the original and proxy groups, the proxy signature primitives can be categorized in multi-proxy signature, proxy multisignature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes [39] . If a company releases a document that may involve the financial department, engineering department, and program office, etc. The document must be signed jointly by these entities, or signed by an authorized proxy signer. One solution to this problem is to use a proxy multi-signature (PMS) scheme in which a proxy signer can generate the signature for the document on behalf of several original signers. Reader may refer to [10, 21, 35] for the details about the proxy signature.
Related work: Yi et al. [40] firstly proposed two PMS schemes in 2000. Sun [30] analyzed that the schemes [40] do not resist the public key substitution attack. Consequently, Sun presented improved PMS schemes that can resist such forgery. Sun's improvement increases security but requires very complex operations (to derive the proxy public key) due to the presence of exponential operations. Equations of such complex operations could be modified at the same level of security because of the concept of elliptic curve introduced by Koblitz [18, 19] and Miller [25] . The ECC can achieve a security level equal to that of RSA and DSA but has a lower computational cost and smaller key size. Therefore, to improve the efficiency of Sun's schemes, Chen et al. [4, 5] proposed the first PMS scheme based on ECC. Park et el. [27] pointed out that the scheme [4] is insecure and the scheme [5] can't resist the conspiracy attack from all original signers but they neither provided an improved version nor a new version. At the same time, Ji and Li [17] proposed a PMS scheme based on ECDLP. However, Cao et al. [7] presented an attack on the scheme [17] by original signer's forgery, and modified the scheme [17] by improving the key generation process. Yin et al. [41] pointed out that the scheme [7] still does not possess the properties of distinguishabil-ity, strong undeniability and presence of proxy misuse. Further they proposed a new PMS scheme with proxy revocation [23, 24] based on ECDLP. Accordingly, their scheme can resolve the proxy revocation and prevent proxy misuse due to use of a signature center. Recently, to resist the forgery attack on the scheme [4] and conspiracy attack on [5] , two modified schemes have been proposed by Xue et al. [38] .
In this journey, so many PMS schemes [2, 13, 20, 28, 37] have been proposed by using the elliptic curve bilinear pairings also. All of these schemes from pairings except [20] are proven secure in the random oracle model (ROM). Two more PMS schemes [22, 33] also exist in the literature having security proof in the standard model [36] . However, in 2010 Sun et al [33] demonstrated that the scheme [22] is insecure to some attacks. Consequently, they proposed a new scheme having security in standard model to defeat these weaknesses. Since the pairing over elliptic curve is regarded as one of the very expensive cryptography primitives. Such use of pairings make the scheme [33] less applicable in practical applications, even secure in standard model. So, the schemes without pairing and based on ECC are more applicable from the efficiency point of view. Recently, some proxy signature schemes without pairings have been proposed [16, 31, 32, 34] . One can also use the batch verification algorithm [14] and specified group of verifier [15] to reduce the proxy signature verification time to make the scheme more efficient. In this article we propose a new PMS scheme based on elliptic curve discrete log problem(ECDLP) without pairing which is provable secure in ROM. It is still an open problem to propose a new PMS scheme based on ECDLP without pairings, secure in standard model.
Our contribution: So many developments of proxy multi-signature scheme without pairings based on ECC have been proposed, as discussed above. They do not have well defined formal security model and proofs. To the best of our knowledge, none of them are proven to be secure even in ROM. ROM [1] is an effective method to measure the practical security of cryptography. In practice, random oracles are used to model cryptographic hash functions in schemes where strong randomness assumptions are required for the hash function's output. Such a proof generally shows that a system or a protocol is secure by showing that an attacker solves mathematical problem believed to be hard, in order to break the protocol. Major application of random oracles is shown in the work of Fiat and Shamir [11] . In this paper, we first define a security model and then propose a PMS scheme based on ECDLP. Our scheme is provable secure against adaptive chosen message attack in the ROM. The relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately more than ten times higher than the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [6] as discussed in the literature [8, 16] etc. In this sense, our proposed scheme is more efficient than the existing schemes [2, 13, 20, 28, 37] based on ECC from bilinear pairings.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the complexity assumption. In Section 3, we give a definition of proxy multi-signature scheme and then define a security model for it. In Section 4, we propose a new proxy multi-signature scheme. We prove its security in Section 5. Section 6 presents a comparative analysis with the existing schemes. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Background of elliptic curve group
Let = denotes an elliptic curve over a prime finite field defined by an equation
, together with an extra point {∞} (called the point at infinity). If the discriminant Δ = (4 + 27 ) mod ≠ 0 , equivalently, the polynomial + + has distinct factors, then / is nonsingular, i.e it does not have any cusp or node singularity. We can define a binary operation (the point addition A"+") on the points of / using chord and tangent rule. The elliptic curve with this binary operation "+" forms an additive abelian group ( / , " + ") = {( , ): , ∈ , ( , ) = 0} ∪ {∞}. Let be a cyclic additive subgroup of ( / , " + ") with generator of prime order . Scalar multiplication over / mean times addition of , that can be calculated using double-and-add method. Reader may refer to [18, 19] for details about the elliptic curve.
Complexity assumption
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP): Given ∈ and the generator of , to compute s.t = is called ECDLP and assumed to be intractable.
Proxy Multi-Signature Scheme
Let be the proxy signer designated by the original signers , , … , .
Definition of Proxy Multi-Signature Scheme
A proxy multi-signature scheme is specified by a polynomial-time algorithms with the following functionalities.  Setup: Given a security parameter , this algorithm outputs the system parameters.  Extract: It takes as input the security parameter k and outputs the secret-public key pairs ( , )
The proxy key generation algorithm takes ∀ = 1, 2, … , and some other secret information (for example, the secret key of the executor) as inputs, and outputs a proxy signing key for proxy signature.  PMSign: The proxy signing algorithm takes a proxy signing key and a message ∈ {0, 1} as inputs, and outputs a proxy signature ( ; ).  PMVerif : The proxy verification algorithm takes , ∀ = 1, 2, … , , , and a proxy signature ( , ) as inputs, and outputs 0 or 1. In the later case, ( , ) is a valid proxy multi-signature on by the proxy signer on behalf of the original signers.
Security Model of Proxy Multi-Signature Scheme
We consider an adversary which is assumed to be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which takes as input the global scheme parameters and a random tape. Existential unforgeability under adaptively chosen-message attack [12] for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, and Verif) is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary .
For PMS scheme, we define an experiment of adversary and security parameter as follows. 
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present a secure PMS scheme based on ECDLP.  Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter , and returns system parameters Ω = { , / , , , , } as defined in Section 2.1. 
Security Analysis
Assume there is an adversary who can break our PMS scheme say ∑ .We will construct a polynomialtime algorithm ℱ that, by simulating the challenger and interacting with , solves the ECDLP.
Theorem 1. If an attacker can break ∑ with at most
-queries and signature queries within time bound and non negligible probability under adaptively chosen message attack against ∑, then there exist an algorithm to solve the ECDLP with nonnegligible probability.
Proof. Suppose an attacker
can break ∑ through adaptively chosen message attack, then [ ( ) = ] is non negligible. Our aim is now to show that using the ability of , one can construct an algorithm ℱ, for solving the ECDLP.
For this purpose, ℱ sets { , / , , , _1, _2 } as system parameters and answers 's queries as described in Section 3.2.
We prove by contradiction that the scheme is secure. The Algorithm ℱ simulates the challenger and interacts with forger as follows.  Setup: Algorithm ℱ starts to obtain public key and private key . The adversary is given .  PMSign-query: is allowed to query the signature oracle for under the delegation = { , , , , = 1, 2, . . . , }. There exist a simulator that simulates the oracle and generates the signature ( , , ) which satisfies the equation Then we have
subtracting equation (2) to (1) 
Comparative Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of the schemes [4, 5, 7, 17, 38, 41] in Table 1 and compare the efficiency of our scheme with the schemes [2, 13, 20, 28, 37] in Table 2 . Since the running time of one pairing operation is 20.04
, ECC-based scalar multiplication is 2.21
, pairing-based scalar multiplication is 6.38
and Map-to-point hash function is 3.04 [16] . These operation times for various cryptographic operations have been obtained using MIRACAL [29] . The hardware platform is a PIV 3 GHZ processor with 512 M bytes memory and the Windows XP operating system. For the pairingbased scheme, to achieve the 1024-bit RSA level security, Tate pairing defined over the supersingular elliptic curve / ∶ = + with embedding degree 2 has been used, where is a 160-bit Solinas prime = 2 + 2 + 1 and a 512-bit prime satisfying + 1 = 12 . For the ECC-based schemes, to achieve the same security level, the parameter secp160r1 [3] , recommended by the Certicom Corporation has been employed, where = 2 − 2 − 1 . We use these running time calculations to present the computational cost comparison in Table 2 . 
Remarks:
1. Since the schemes [4, 5, 7, 17, 38, 41] do not provide any formal security proof, we do not feel to compare the efficiency of our proposed scheme with them.
2. Our scheme has the running time only 15.12% of [20] , 10.47% of [13] , 8.41% of [37] , 9.36% of [2] and 10.28% of [28] .
Open Problem:
ECDLP based schemes are fully exponential time and have the same security level as RSA and DSA, but smaller key size. On the other hand, pairing is regarded as an expensive cryptography primitive. Therefore, we think that schemes based on ECDLP without pairing would be more appealing in terms of efficiency. We propose first PMS scheme without pairing and secure in ROM. But it is still an open problem to propose a new PMS scheme based on ECDLP without pairings, secure in standard model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first defined a security model of PMS scheme, then proposed a PMS scheme based on ECDLP. It provides theoretical foundations for the provable security of PMS schemes based on ECDLP. Our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attack in the ROM.
